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Abstract
The background for this masters thesis is the threat of session hijacking
in public wireless networks. A public wireless network in this context is
a network such as Wireless Trondheim where users with WLAN enabled
devices can connect for a small fee for a given period of time. These kind
of networks relies on having a high degree of user friendliness to reach users
with average knowledge in computers and wireless networks.
There is always a struggle between user friendliness and security and the
downside to the user friendliness in these kind of networks is poor security.
Many of these networks only use the unique identifier (MAC address) of the
network device to identify users and grant them access. A person with some
technical knowledge about wireless networks and less then honest intentions
may exploit this weak security barrier and impersonate the legitimate user
by duplicating the MAC address.
The practical part of this master thesis starts with the setup of a test
bench with three computers, an attacker, a legitimate client and a passive
monitor. A MAC spoofing attack was performed on the production network
to prove that this kind of attack is easy to perform. The attack was first
done with Backtrack which is a specialized penetration testing OS and the
same type of attack was done in Windows to also prove that it does not
require specialized tools. The attacker was able to gain access to the Internet
without going through the web page for authentication.
The thesis also proposes some countermeasures against this kind of at-
tack. They are session ID, MAC sequence number tracking and monitoring
physical properties such as received signal strength and RTS-CTS hand-
shake round trip times. The thesis presents some thoughts on how they
can be implemented in the wireless Trondheim network and what the major
difficulties of each of them might be. The thesis also makes an evaluation
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of how well each of them fit with Wireless Trondheims requirements for
countermeasures against the attacks done in this thesis.
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Preface
This thesis was written as the final part of a master’s degree in Communica-
tions technology with specialization in information security. It was carried
out at the Department of Telematics (ITEM) at the Norwegian University
of Science and Technology (NTNU) during spring 2009.
During november and december 2008 the choice of of subject for the
master’s thesis had to be made. The subject about security in public wireless
networks seemed interesting and was part of my list of prioritized subjects.
This was the subject I was appointed and in January 2009 I met with my
main supervisor Thomas Jelle and my co-supervisor Martin Eian to work
on a problem description. It had initially a broad focus on general security
threats against public wireless networks, but after input from the professor
responisble for the thesis Stig F. Mjølsnes it was refined to only cover session
hijacking attacks.
The work on this thesis has been interesting and educational and I have
gained useful insight in wireless networks and security surrounding them.
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Introduction
1.1 Background for the thesis
In the later years the use of wireless networks has become more and more
widespread because of the flexibility and ease of connection they offer. Secu-
rity in wireless networks have some additional challenges compared to wired
networks. This is due to the fact that the traffic is transferred as radio waves
in the air and anyone close enough with an antenna can receive them.
Wireless Trondheim is a provider of Internet access through wireless
LAN in the city center of Trondheim. Anyone with a laptop or other WLAN
enabled device can connect to Wireless Trondheim and after connecting the
users will be redirected to a web-page with several options to gain access
to the Internet. A public wireless network such as Wireless Trondheim is
dependent on having a high degree of user friendliness to attract users with
average knowledge about computers and computer networks. The problem
with this is that there is always a compromise between security and user
friendliness.
As a consequence of its user friendliness the access solution used by
most of the users of Wireless Trondheim has security flaws that are easily
exploitable by a person with some technical knowledge about wireless net-
works. The traffic is unencrypted and is vulnerable to eavesdropping and
with an unencrypted network users are also vulnerable to a session hijacking
attack.
When an attacker performs a session hijacking attack he fools the net-
work into believing that the attacker is the legitimate user. From Wireless
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Trondheims viewpoint there is up to date no way to tell the attacker and
the client apart. The concern of Wireless Trondheim is that an attacker can
use this for criminal purposes and that an investigation of those activities
will point to the legitimate user.
Wireless Trondheim would therefore like to have a system that can detect
the presence of a session hijacking attack. Such a system could prevent
innocent users from being accused of criminal activity if they have been
victim to a session hijacking attack. Wireless Trondheim does not, however,
wish to reduce its current level of user friendliness. Such a system could also
have the ability to throw users off the network immediately when session
hijacking is discovered, but Wireless Trondheim does not wish to do this.
The system should make logs of the registered activity that can be analyzed
for suspicious activity at a later point in time.
Wireless Trondheim also offers access to eduroam which is built on more
secure technology then the more popular network. This network is only
available to students or staff associated with NTNU and other academic in-
stitutions abroad and requires a lot more configuration to use. This network
will not be in focus in this thesis.
1.2 Thesis goals
The first goal in this thesis should be to find practical session hijacking
attacks that can be executed in experiments. The experiments should then
be conducted to prove the statement that such attacks are easy to perform.
After the attacks have been successfully performed research should be
conducted to find countermeasures that can detect the presence of such at-
tacks. These countermeasures should be evaluated based on Wireless Trond-
heims wishes. These wishes are no decrease in user friendliness and the abil-
ity to make logs that can be analyzed at a later time to uncover suspicious
activity.
1.3 Thesis outline
The following is a list of the chapters in the thesis and a short summary of
what they contain.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
This introduction chapter
Chapter 2 - Theory
Basic theory behind the technologies this thesis builds on, such as 802.11,
Intrusion detection systems, MAC addresses and other things.
Chapter 3 - Penetration testing
This chapter describes the practical penetration testing attacks that were
conducted in this thesis.
Chapter 4 - Countermeasures
Describes the countermeasures against session hijacking that were discov-
ered. It also contains some thoughts on how they can be implemented into
the Wireless Trondheim network and the difficulties that might occur.
Chapter 5 - Results
A quick summary of the results from this thesis
Chapter 6 - Discussion
Discusses some aspect of an IDS in Wireless Trondheim and makes rec-
ommendations on how well the proposed countermeasures fit with Wireless
Trondheims wishes.
Chapter 7 - Conclusion and future work
A summary of the results from chapter 6 and future work that can be based
on the results of this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Theory
2.1 Introduction to Wireless Trondheim
The goal of Wireless Trondheim is to supply wireless Internet access in
Trondheim and to make the city a laboratory for development of wireless and
mobile solutions. [7] Wireless Trondheim is a cooperation between NTNU
and a few local government branches and businesses.
2.1.1 Access methods in Wireless Trondheim
When writing this thesis there are two main methods of gaining access to
Wireless Trondheim. The less secure portal solution and the more secure
WPA2 solution.
2.1.1.1 Portal
The wireless network with SSID tradlosetrondheim in downtown Trondheim
is the SSID for the portal solution. It is encryption free and anyone can
connect. However if an unauthenticated user makes a web request to any
other web page then a small number of white listed urls he will be redirected
to the web-portal where the user is presented with a few authentication
options. Among these are the option to pay 10 NOK by SMS for 3 hours
access and to log in with your NTNU user name and password. This initial
authentication on the web-portal is done over a secure SSL transaction, but
after the authentication the traffic between STA and AP is unencrypted.
The Nomadix gateway uses MAC filtering to allow authenticated users to
be routed to the Internet.
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2.1.1.2 WPA2
Wireless Trondheim also supports a more secure connection for users that
have access to Eduroam. Eduroam is a roaming infrastructure in use by
research and academic communities. It allows its users to connect to WLANs
at each others institutions across Europe and Australia. [5] NTNU is a part
of eduroam so it is available through the wireless network on the campuses of
Gløshaugen and Dragvoll. Wireless Trondheim also offers access to eduroam
through their network.
The security mechanisms in use for eduroam are 802.11i compliant. The
security is therefore considered as very good by todays standards.
2.1.2 Wireless Trondheim architecture
Building and configuring large wireless networks can be a difficult challenge.
A large network consists of many access points and if all of these had to be
configured manually one by one large wireless networks would have serious
scalability issues. That’s why centralization of configuration and access
control is the way to go.
Wireless Trondheim is built on the Unified Wireless Network architecture
from Cisco [4]. The Cisco Unified Wireless Network uses both wired and
wireless components to tackle the challenges in creating a large scalable
wireless network. Cisco can deliver all parts of an enterprise wireless network
from client devices to network management devices. In the description of
CUWN, Cisco states that their solution cover all the 5 areas they have
defined that a fully functional enterprise wireless network should consist of.
These 5 areas are:
• Client devices
• Access points
• Network unification
• Network management
• Mobility services
Wireless Trondheim has no need to cover all these areas and has taken
a couple of these to create a network that satisfies its needs.
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Figure 2.1: Simple overview of the portal solution network in Wireless
Trondheim
2.1.2.1 Lightweight access point
Figure 2.1 gives a general overview of the network architecture in wireless
Trondheim, but note that it is only accurate for the portal solution. The
main benefit this architecture has is the use of Lightweight access points. In
a simple wireless home network the access point is in reality a multifunction
device. It handles the wireless channel, authentication of clients and routing
of IP traffic. All the lightweight access point does is to send and receive
wireless link layer frames between the client stations and Wireless LAN
Controllers (WLC). Most access points have wired connections to the rest
of the network, but they can also be connected to each other via a wireless
link in case wiring is difficult to perform.
2.1.2.2 WLC
The WLCs centralize the configuration of the wireless network and makes
the configuration a lot easier in large networks. The access points are con-
figured automatically by a WLC when it is connected to the network. That
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removes the need to configure each access point manually one by one.
The WLCs delivered by Cisco supports several SSIDs and on the wired
part of the network traffic from different SSIDs are kept apart by using
VLANs. When each SSID has its own VLAN it is easy to e.g. deploy
different security mechanisms to different wireless networks which is what
Wireless Trondheim has done with Tradlosetrondheim and eduroam. To
a user they are two different networks, but they are handled by the same
infrastructure.
2.1.2.3 Nomadix gateway
Anyone can connect to the SSID TradloseTrondheim in downtown Trond-
heim, but surfing on the web is restricted to a small number of white listed
sites. The nomadix gateway keeps a list of MAC addresses for the authen-
ticated users. When a user with a non listed MAC address connects and
makes a request for a web page that is not white listed the nomadix gateway
performs some http trickery to make the users browser display the Wireless
Trondheim authentication portal. Nomadix is a common solution to achieve
this kind of functionality in public access wireless networks. Nomadix is not
a product of Cisco, but it can be integrated into their unified network solu-
tions.
2.2 Basics of the wireless MAC layer
This section will briefly explain some of the basics of the 802.11 MAC layer
to prepare the reader for the following sections which will use many of the
basics concepts.
The widely used 802.11 standard operates on layer 2 and layer 1 in the
TCP/IP model 2.2. The purpose of layer 2 is to ensure error free data
transfer between two network interfaces often on a shared medium. The
purpose of layer 1 is to define the way bits are transformed into physical
signals that can be transferred over a medium. In 802.11s case the data
transfer is being done via radio waves and the shared medium is the air.
Using the air as a shared medium creates some challenges that 802.11 has
to take care of to ensure the wireless clients can communicate with as little
interference as possible, but that is not in the scope of this thesis.
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Figure 2.2: The 5 layer TCP/IP model
The data that a wireless client wants to send is separated into frames and
a MAC header 2.3 is added to each frame. This header contains important
information about the data transfer where the sender and receiver addresses
are the two most important fields.
Figure 2.3: The MAC header fields, from [2]
The addresses are 48-bits or 6 bytes long and are known as the MAC ad-
dresses. 48 bits is a long string of 1s and 0s so a MAC address is most often
written as 6 bytes in hexadecimal form to make it more human readable.
E.g. 00:11:22:33:AA:BB. Each network interface device has its own MAC
address which is stored in the hardware. The MAC address is in principle
supposed to be unique for every network device in the world and manufac-
turers makes sure that each of their network interface devices are shipped
with a unique address. The problem is that it is easy to change this address
most often by bypassing the hard coded MAC address in the network device
via functions in the computers OS. This opens for MAC spoofing attacks
which are the basis of this thesis.
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2.2.1 MAC spoofing
MAC spoofing basically means to change the MAC address your network
card uses to identify itself on the network. By changing the MAC address
an attacker can pose as another user or conceal his own MAC address on a
wireless or wired network. In Windows this can be done by editing a value
in the registry that contains the MAC address. After changing the value the
wireless interface just needs to be restarted and it will start using the new
MAC address on the network.
In Linux it is even easier. In Ubuntu a program named macchanger is
available through the package manager and this program will change the
MAC address of an interface with 3 simple commands.
At the time of writing this thesis Wireless Trondheim has no means
of detecting the presence of attacks where the attacker changes his MAC
address to impersonate a user.
2.3 TCP connections
TCP is located in layer 4 of the TCP/IP model 2.2. Layer 2 offers data
transfer between two nodes on a link, layer 3 offers data transfer between
two arbitrary nodes in a network and layer 4 deals with flow control and
connections between nodes. A basic knowledge of how TCP connections are
set up is needed at a later point in this thesis so a quick explanation follows.
Figure 2.4: TCP connection sequence diagram
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Lets say a user is browsing the web and wants to check vg.no which is the
web edition of Norway’s largest newspaper. The users computer first needs
to set up a TCP connection to the vg.no webserver to be able to request
data. The first step is that the users computer sends a SYN message shown
in figure 2.4 to indicate to the vg.no webserver that it wishes to initiate
a connection. The webserver responds with a SYN-ACK to indicate it is
ready for the connection. Then the users computer responds with an ACK
to finalize the connection setup. After the connection is successfully set up
the users browser can request data from the vg.no webserver.
2.4 Previous work
The following is a short summary of the articles this thesis is based on. Their
main focus is countermeasures against MAC spoofing attacks in wireless
networks.
2.4.1 Article on MAC spoofing types and countermeasures
The article "Detecting and Blocking Unauthorized Access in Wi-Fi Net-
works" [10] is written by Xia and Brustolini at the University of Pittsburgh.
This article separates MAC spoofing into three approaches an attacker might
choose. These approaches are hijacking where the attacker actively throws
the victim off the network, freeloading where the attacker uses the network
simultaneously with the victim and waiting for availability where the at-
tacker waits until the user is not using the network. After describing these
variations on MAC spoofing attacks the article describes some countermea-
sures and they also do practical experiments with the countermeasures.
2.4.2 Articles from QUT
The articles "Passive Techniques for Detecting Session Hijacking Attacks in
IEEE 802.11 Wireless Networks" [8] and "Experiences in Passively Detecting
Session Hijacking Attacks in IEEE 802.11 Networks" [9] are written by Gill,
Smith, Looi and Clark from Queensland University of Technology. These
articles take a different approach then the previous one in detecting MAC
spoofing attacks.
They are looking at physical properties in the radio transmission to
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detect if there are more then one client using the same MAC address. These
two properties are the received signal strength and the round trip time for
a specific type of message. By correlating between these two methods they
get promising experimental results in [9].
2.5 Attacks
2.5.1 MAC spoofing
This attack is aimed at the portal solution in Wireless Trondheim and it
is in theory simple. When connecting with the portal solution in Wireless
Trondheim a user must first go through the authentication procedure on
the web-portal. The authentication procedure is done via an SSL protected
web-page and cannot be listened to by an eavesdropper. After the authen-
tication is completed the authenticated user is white listed in a MAC filter
maintained by the Nomadix gateway and its web requests are routed to the
Internet. The theory is that the attacker can spoof the MAC address of a
connected user to gain access.
The attackers access will only last until the legitimate users white listing
in the Nomadix MAC filter times out or the user uses the log off function
after he is finished using the network.
2.5.2 Variations of MAC spoofing
There are some variations on how this type of attack can be performed as
explained in [10]. The variation is on how the attacker treats the already
existing client with the MAC address that the attacker is spoofing. It is
difficult to detect all the variations using a single detection method so effec-
tive intrusion detection against all of them is dependent on a combination
of methods.
2.5.2.1 Session hijacking
In this variation the attacker listens to the target network for a client MAC
address and the APs MAC address. The attacker uses the APs MAC address
to send fake deauthenticate messages to the client and the client will then
terminate its association with the AP. The attacker can then spoof the clients
MAC and have the session for himself. A problem with this method is that
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normally the client will try to reconnect quite often and the deauthenticate
procedure will have to be repeated frequently.
Another problem is how an attacker will be able to send deauthenticate
frames at the same time as he is using the network. To be able to use the
network normally the network interface would need to be in managed mode,
but when sending fake traffic the network interface must be in monitor mode.
One solution could be to have one interface for each task, but then another
problem arises.
The attacker has spoofed the MAC address of the user to be able to
gain access to the network and the fake deauthenticate frames have the AP
as sender and the client MAC as the receiver. With this setup the same
deauthenticate frames that is intended to keep the legitimate client off the
network will also cause the attacker to be thrown off. The attacker would
have to modify his protocol stack to ignore deauthenticate frames, but this
might have unfortunate side effects since deauthenticate frames have other
legitimate purposes.
2.5.2.2 Freeloading
In the freeloading variant the attacker assumes the same MAC address and
IP as the attacker. The difference from the hijacking attack is that the client
is not thrown off the network, but the attacker communicates simultaneously
with the client. On the MAC layer this works fine, but when using TCP
problems may occur in the transport layer.
When setting up a TCP connection the initiator sends a SYN message
to the target system which responds with a SYN-ACK message as explained
in section 2.3. The attacker and client are using the same MAC address so
both will receive the SYN-ACK response, but only one of them has initiated
that connection. The standard TCP procedure is to send a TCP-RST (reset)
message when receiving a SYN-ACK for an unknown connection. The TCP-
RST message then terminates the connection. This means that a TCP
connection initiated by either the client or attacker will be terminated by
the other.
Most systems however have some sort of firewall, especially since Win-
dows XP with service pack 2 or above and Windows Vista has one integrated
into the OS. If this firewall is configured to ignore traffic from unknown con-
nections the TCP-RST message will not be sent. The attacker can then set
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up his own firewall for this purpose and hope that the victim has a firewall
that will allow his own traffic to stay uninterrupted.
2.5.2.3 Waiting for availability
If an attacker don’t want to risk detection by actively faking traffic to throw
the client off the network or to communicate simultaneously with the client
the attacker can simply wait until the client is no longer using its session. A
users session in Wireless Trondheim lasts from 3 to 24 hours. If an authen-
ticated user browses to www.tradlosetrondheim.no there will be a button to
log off the network which will remove the user from the Nomadix white list.
If a user uses this function the wait for availability approach will not work,
but many user are probably unaware of this function or does not remember
to use it.
2.6 Countermeasures
2.6.1 Basics on Intrusion detection systems
Network intrusion detection systems are systems designed to detect attacks
against a network or system in a network. The IDS can be either passive or
reactive. A passive IDS will only log suspicious activity and make alarms for
an operator to evaluate. A reactive IDS will take action against an attack
and can reset connections or reprogram a firewall to block the harmful traffic.
A reactive IDS is also called an Intrusion prevention system (IPS).
Network intrusion detection can like everything else not be perfect and
errors occur when trying to separate normal and harmful behavior in a
network. The ideal IDS will always detect all kinds of attacks and never
flag normal behavior as suspicious. A real world IDS can only try to come
as close to this goal as possible.
2.6.1.1 False positive and false negative
There are two important terms in relation to IDSs that will be used in the
following sections. The first term false positive is used to describe a situation
where the IDS has detected suspicious behavior when there is in reality no
harmful activity. The second term false negative is used when an actual
attack remains undetected by the IDS.
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There are two different method an IDS can use to separate normal be-
havior from harmful behavior.
2.6.1.2 Statistical anomaly
A statistical anomaly IDS has a baseline for what is considered normal
network traffic. It will then compare the current network traffic with the
baseline. If the sampled traffic is outside the boundaries for the baseline
behavior the IDS will respond.
2.6.1.3 Signature based
Signature based IDSs are configured with patterns that are based on what an
attacker will do to attack the protected network. Since attackers will adapt
their attacks in new ways to avoid the current signatures the signature based
IDS is in need of constant upgrades to detect new attacks.
2.6.2 MAC spoofing countermeasures
The two following countermeasures are described in [10] and they are aimed
at detecting the various types of MAC spoofing attacks covered earlier.
2.6.2.1 Session ID
When a user logs into a public wireless network it is common to give the
user a session management page in a small pop-up window. The session ID
countermeasure uses a cookie that is associated with this web page. The
cookie contains a cryptographically random session ID. The web page is
tagged with an HTTP directive that makes the clients browser periodically
request a refresh. For every refresh the client browser also sends the cookie
containing the session ID. The web page is secured with SSL to keep the
session ID hidden from eavesdropping attackers.
This countermeasure is effective against the session hijacking and waiting
for availability types of MAC spoofing described earlier. When the attacker
either waits for the real client to stop using its session or actively throws the
user off the network the IDS system will detect that it is no longer receiving
the refresh requests from the client. The attacker will not be able to fake
the random session ID if it has sufficient length and cryptographic strength.
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2.6.2.2 MAC frame sequence number
This countermeasure revolves around the sequence numbers in the MAC
frame headers [2]. When a wireless station sends layer 2 frames the sequence
number is incremented by one for each frame sent. With only one legitimate
client on a link the sequence number should be a steadily increasing value.
However if an attacker launches a freeloading attack there will be some
anomalies in the sequence number values. An IDS system should be able
to detect two distinct counters for MAC frame sequence numbers if the the
attacker also follows the standard. This is shown in figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5: Figure from [10] showing two different counters for a set of layer
2 frames
An attacker might decide not to follow the standard for MAC frame
sequence numbers. The attacker could try to always send frames with the
last sequence number sent by the client incremented by one to try and mimic
a normal counter. The client who does not know anything about the attacker
will just continue its own counter and this leads to duplicate values within a
smaller timeframe then usual. An IDS could be designed to also takes this
event into account.
This countermeasure is only effective against the freeloading type of at-
tack. This is because it is dependent on two clients communicating using the
same MAC address in the same time frame. In the case of the hijacking and
waiting for availability variants there will at best be a jump in the sequence
numbers when the attacker takes over the session. After the attacker has
taken over its MAC sequence number counter will look like any other.
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2.6.2.3 Combining countermeasures
Because the two countermeasures describes earlier only works for separate
varieties of MAC spoofing attacks they should be combined. If an IDS uses
analyzes network traffic with both methods it can provide a full coverage of
the MAC spoofing attacks described in this thesis.
Combining detection methods is generally a useful approach in intrusion
detection systems. When two overlapping detection techniques are combined
where each of them has a certain percentage for success, the sum of the two
will be greater then the two by them self. If two or more detection techniques
detects an anomaly at the same time an IDS system can be much more
certain that it is real even though the detection methods by them self is not
very reliable.
The downside of combining one or more detection methods can be that
the IDS might overlook an actual attack because it did not trigger the various
detection methods to the degree needed to create an alarm.
In the case of the MAC sequence number analysis and session ID coun-
termeasures this approach can not be used to increase the accuracy of de-
tection. This is because these two countermeasures only works for separate
variations of the MAC spoofing attack. An alarm from both these detection
methods at the same time will not be possible. If an attacker freeloads, the
MAC sequence number analysis will raise an alarm, but the real client will
still send responses to the session ID refreshes keeping the session ID check-
ing from detecting anything. If an attacker performs a hijacking attack only
one MAC sequence number counter will be present which prevents MAC
sequence number analysis from detecting anything, but session ID checking
will react to the lack of session ID refreshes.
2.7 Other MAC spoofing countermeasures
The following section describes the detection methods from [8] and [9].
2.7.1 Received signal strength
The first of the two methods revolves around measuring the signal strength
of the frames received by an AP or a wireless sensor. The idea is that when a
user is connected to the network his signal strength will be relatively stable
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and only vary within a certain range. However if an attacker is using the
same MAC address as the user his signal strength will be noticeably different
then the clients. Figure 2.6 is an illustration of this. The signal strength
can vary for many different reasons such as differences in radio equipment,
reflections and refractions in the radio path and the distance between sender
and receiver. If the signal strength from frames sent by a single MAC address
varies more then normal the IDS can flag this as suspicious and make an
alarm.
Figure 2.6: Attacker and client with different signal strength seen by the
AP
The challenge with this method is that even under normal conditions
with only the user connected the signal strength will vary significantly. In
conditions where the variation in signal strength under normal operation is
bigger then the expected variation generated by an attacker a false positive
response will be triggered by the IDS. The tuning of this intrusion detection
method to separate normal variation from suspicious variation is challenging.
2.7.2 RTS-CTS handshake
The second method revolves around the Request to send - Clear to send
(RTS-CTS) mechanism in 802.11. This mechanism is made to avoid colli-
sions between data frames. If two frames are sent at the same time they will
interfere with each other and the receiver will not be able to make sense of
any of them. This is because of the shared medium properties of the air.
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When a node is sending a frame every other node in range can "hear" it and
not only the receiver.
This is a simplified explanation of the RTS-CTS mechanism, [8] goes
through it in more detail. When a wireless node wants to send data it can
send an RTS frame to its intended recipient. When the target node receives
the RTS frame it will transmit a CTS frame back to the node sending the
RTS. If any other nodes in range receives either the RTS or CTS frame it
will halt its transmissions for a given period of time. The time a node needs
to halt transmissions is included in both the RTS and CTS frames.
Gill et. al. proposes to use this mechanism for IDS purposes. The
RTS and CTS frame have fixed sizes and at a fixed bit rate the only thing
that can create variations in the time it takes to complete the RTS-CTS
handshake is the radio path between the sender and the receiver. When an
attacker has spoofed the MAC address of a client the RTS-CTS handshake
will always have a different round trip time for the attacker then for the
client, as illustrated in figure 2.7.
If a large enough difference in RTS-CTS RTT is detected by the IDS
an alarm can be raised. This method also has some tuning issues since the
RTS-CTS RTT can vary even in normal conditions with only a legitimate
client.
Figure 2.7: Attacker and client with different RTS-CTS times seen by the
AP
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2.7.3 Correlating between the two methods
Gill et. al. uses the principle mentioned earlier about correlating the results
from two or more detection methods to make more reliable decisions. In [9]
they have made a correlation engine that combines the output of the two
detection methods. When one of the methods detects something suspicious
the correlation engine checks the result from the other method. An alarm
is raised only if both detection methods create an alert at the same time.
This way the rate of false positives is decreased.
20
Chapter 3
Penetration testing
This chapter describes the practical part of this thesis which comprises of
the test network setup, installation of the necessary software and the MAC
spoofing attacks in Backtrack and Windows.
3.1 The test network
This section gives an overview of the test network and what the purpose of
the components are. The components are summarized in figure 3.1.
3.1.1 Wireless Trondheim AP
After an evaluation of the risks to the production network in wireless Trond-
heim it was decided to perform the attack on the production network itself.
The attack were to be performed on a dedicated client computer and none
of the other users of Wireless Trondheim would be affected by this. A
fully functional access point for Wireless Trondheim was therefore put up
in Wireless Trondheims office in room 241 in the IT building at NTNU.
3.1.2 Client
This is the computer that will play the role of the innocent user of Wireless
Trondheim. The PC is a Dell GX270 desktop, table 3.1 contains its most
important specifications.
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CPU Pentium 4 2.60 GHz
RAM 1.25 GB
OS Windows XP Service pack 3
WLAN interface card ASUS 802.11g
Table 3.1: Client computer specifications
3.1.3 Attacker
The attacker computer is the authors personal laptop which is an HP pavil-
ion dv9000. A laptop is flexible in where it can be used so it is a natural
choice when attacking a WLAN. During the work on the thesis I found out
that the network chip set on the laptop was not ideal for work on wireless
penetration testing. To start it in monitor mode is easily done by loading a
different driver, but traffic injection is harder to do and requires a lengthy
process of patching the driver. No traffic injection is needed for the attack in
this thesis so it did not become an issue. The most important specifications
of the attacker computer is shown in table 3.2
CPU Intel Core 2 duo 1.83GHz
RAM 2GB
OS Windows XP
WLAN interface card Intel PRO/Wireless 3945ABG
Table 3.2: Attacker computer specifications
3.1.4 Passive monitor
A 3rd computer is useful to listen to the traffic on the network when the
attack is in progress. This computer has a network interface card with the
Atheros chip set. This chip set is popular in wireless penetration testing
because it is easy to make the card do packet injection.
CPU Pentium 4 2.60 GHz
RAM 1.25 GB
OS Ubuntu 8.10
WLAN interface card Atheros Communications Inc. AR5413 802.11abg
Table 3.3: Passive monitor computer specifications
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Figure 3.1: Overview of the test network
3.2 Tools
3.2.1 Backtrack
Backtrack is not a single tool, but an operating system which is focused
on network penetration testing. It contains a wide selection of penetration
testing oriented tools of which this master thesis only scratches the surface.
Backtrack is built on the live CD Linux distribution Slax. A live CD distri-
bution does not require to be installed on a computers hard drive. Instead
it can be run from a bootable CD or USB memory stick and does not do
any changes to the system it is run on. Slax is built on Slackware which is
the oldest Linux distribution that is still maintained. Backtrack is built on
Slax and Slax is built on Slackware as illustrated in figure 3.4.
Backtrack
Slax
Slackware
Table 3.4: Backtrack layers
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3.2.2 Kismet
Kismet is a wireless traffic analysis tool written by Mike Kershaw. Kismet
separates itself from many other wireless network analysis tools in that it
is entirely passive. This means it does not send any traffic and can not be
detected by other wireless nodes in range. It is an open source program and
is licensed under the GNU GPL license [6].
Among its wireless monitoring capabilities are associating wireless clients
with the network they are connected to, hidden SSID De cloaking, channel
hopping and the possibility of GPS coordinate logging of WLANs.
Kismet also has some IDS functionality. It can detect many active wire-
less network monitoring programs such as Netstumbler. The active network
monitoring programs actively send traffic to trigger responses from the tar-
get networks and can be detected by the traffic they send. Kismet can also
detect some simple wireless attacks, but Kismet does not detect the kind of
attack this thesis revolves around.
3.2.3 Aircrack-ng
Aircrack-ng is a suite of many programs written by Thomas d’Otreppe that
are used for wireless penetration testing. Aircrack-ng contains programs that
can capture wireless traffic, detect wireless APs and clients, crack WEP keys
and WPA TKIP pass phrases. Aircrack-ng is free software licensed under
GPL. In this thesis Aircrack-ng is only used to capture traffic and dump it
to a pcap file which is readable by Wireshark.
3.2.4 Wireshark
Wireshark can also capture traffic like the two previous tools, but this is not
its most important functionality. Wireshark has a graphical front-end that
displays the captured traffic and has powerful functionality to sort and filter
data. Wireshark started as Ethereal which was written by Gerald Combs.
Combs needed a tool that could capture and analyze packet data so he
wrote the original Ethereal. This protocol analyzer became popular and
today more then 500 people have contributed to the Wireshark project.
In 2006 Combs changed job and since his old employer owned the name
Ethereal the name would have to be changed and the new name is Wireshark.
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Wireshark is a tool that "understands" many network protocols and can
therefore extract useful information such as header values for various proto-
cols and what type of packet or protocol data is encapsulated in. Wireshark
is most often used for network debugging and analysis, network application
and protocol development and education.
3.2.5 Installing Backtrack
For my masters thesis I chose to install Backtrack (BT) on a USB stick since
it is much faster then running it from a CD. BT can also be installed on
the hard drive like operating systems usually are. When running Backtrack
from a CD it is obvious that no changes will be saved since a CD is a read
only memory (ROM). When running Backtrack from a USB stick it has by
default the same behavior even though a USB stick is not a ROM. Some
small modifications must be made before Backtrack will save changes made
to configuration and new files that are made. The steps to install Backtrack
and make it save changes is summarized in the list below.
• Prepare partitions on the USB stick
• Download the Backtrack image and unpack it to the USB stick
• Make the USB stick bootable
• Make a folder for changes and modify syslinux.cfg
I used a tutorial on the remote exploit forums which goes through all
of these steps [1]. The tutorial is originally for BT2, but as it says in the
tutorial it can be easily modified for BT3. When I was going through the
steps in the tutorial I found it a bit confusing since I did not understand
the purpose of some of the steps. The purpose of this section is therefore to
summarize the main steps and explain their purpose. I recommend to read
read this part first and then go through the tutorial for the full walkthrough
of what to do.
3.2.5.1 Prepare partitions on the USB stick
The first step in the tutorial is to make 4 partitions that will be used for vari-
ous purposes. These partitions are listed below along with the recommended
minimum sizes from the tutorial.
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• FAT32 (1-1.5GB)
• SWAP (1GB)
• ext2 (5GB)
• FAT32 or ext2 (Remaining space)
These partitions can be made with the partition manager program qt-
parted which is standard in Backtrack or available through the aptitude
package manager in Ubuntu. Note what reference the third partition has as
this is important to get exactly right at a later point. E.g. sda3 or sdb3.
3.2.5.2 Download the Backtrack image and unpack it to the USB
stick
The tutorial suggest to unpack the BT image after creating only the first
partition. I created all the partitions first and then unpacked BT3 to the
first partition. BT is available in an iso image which can be opened in
Winrar and then simply unpacked like any other compressed archive.
3.2.5.3 Make the USB stick bootable
Backtrack has now been copied to the USB stick, but when starting a PC
with the USB stick inserted Backtrack will not boot because the USB stick
is not bootable. This is where bootinst.bat comes in. This file is now on
the partition where Backtrack was unpacked and only needs some small
modifications before it can be run.
At this point in the tutorial there is a warning written in caps with red
color. If bootinst.bat is located on the hard drive of the OS running it it
will ruin the boot capabilities of the OS and render the computer useless.
How hard it will be to fix this error is not known to me, but the tutorial
makes a clear warning against it.
3.2.5.4 Make a folder for changes and modify syslinux.cfg
The last step is to make a folder for changes and then make changes to
syslinux.cfg to tell backtrack to use that folder for changes. When a Linux
distribution is started it uses a command string that determines some impor-
tant startup parameters. Syslinux.cfg contains several of these and when the
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computer boots from the USB stick a list of different startup alternatives
appears. Each of these startup alternatives has its own command string
that determines its startup parameters. It is useful to figure out which the
startup alternatives that works best after making the USB stick bootable,
but before making the modifications to include changes.
After figuring out which alternative works best backtrack can be told to
store the changes that the user makes while using the OS. The first step to
doing this is to add a folder named changes on the third partition (ext2).
The second step is to add an argument to the startup command string
of the startup alternative chosen earlier. This is as mentioned located in
syslinux.cfg It is important to match the reference to the partition in the
argument to what it says when booted in Backtrack, sda3, sdb3 or sdc3 and
so on.
The preferred startup alternative can also be moved to the top of sys-
linux.cfg so it will be selected as default. Timeout can also be set to a lower
value so the computer does not wait so long to start Backtrack if the user
is absent.
3.3 MAC Spoofing
The easiest way to connect to Wireless Trondheim is to use the portal solu-
tion. The authentication at the portal is done via an SSL encrypted session
so it is not feasible to break this and recover the authentication information.
After the authentication however the only access control mechanism is the
MAC address filtering at the Nomadix gateway.
This section describes the MAC spoofing attack in detail with screen-
shots that illustrates how the important data needed to setup the spoofed
connection with Wireless Trondheim was found. I used Backtrack to per-
form the attack the first time, but I realized that it was simple enough to
be done in Windows as well. Windows has a much more limited selection
of penetration testing tools freely available so this is not the case for more
advanced attacks.
3.3.1 MAC spoofing in Backtrack
The following is a detailed description of how the MAC spoofing attack
was performed using the tools in Backtrack. It should be noted that this
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attack can easily be performed in other Linux distributions which are less
specialized towards penetration testing. Ubuntu for instance has all the
tools used available through the aptitude packet manager. The goal of the
attack is that the attacker is able to access the Internet through Wireless
Trondheim without authenticating through the web-portal. The attacker
should acquire all the information needed to execute the attack by passive
monitoring the traffic in Wireless Trondheim.
3.3.1.1 Necessary information
To be able to spoof the MAC address of the wireless client and to set up
a connection with Wireless Trondheim the attacker needs some information
about the client and the network in Wireless Trondheim. This information
is summarized in the list below.
• The channel the AP is on
• The APs MAC address
• Clients MAC address
• Clients IP address
• Subnet mask
• Default gateway
• DNS server address
3.3.1.2 Wireless card in monitor mode
The first thing to do to start listening to traffic is to make the wireless card
start in monitor mode. In normal operation when the user is connected to
a wireless network a wireless card is in managed mode. In this mode it only
passes packets with its own MAC address as destination to the OS. All other
traffic to other nodes is discarded.
In monitor mode a network card will pass all the frames it receives re-
gardless of MAC address to the OS which can then be stored and analyzed.
After struggling with it I found out that with the laptops network card this
could be done with two simple commands.
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bt ~ # modprobe -r iwl3945
bt ~ # modprobe ipwraw
Modprobe is an application that adds or removes modules from the Linux
kernel. The first command unloads the driver used under normal use of the
network card. The second loads a driver that supports monitor mode.
3.3.1.3 Start sniffing for information
A good place to start is the MAC address of the Wireless Trondheim access
point and the channel it uses. Kismet is a good tool to get an overview of
nearby wireless networks and to get more info on a specific network. When
Kismet is started it will continuously capture traffic and list the networks
it finds in real-time. After sorting the list the networks become selectable.
Figure 3.2 is a screenshot from Kismet where TradloseTrondheim has been
selected and it displays some information for the Wireless Trondheim net-
work.
From this screenshot two of the points from the list of required informa-
tion can be find. These are:
• The channel the AP is on: 11
• The APs MAC address: 00:23:5d:0e:01:90
With this data a more specific capture of traffic can be done where only
traffic to and from the wireless Trondheim access point is captured. For this
purpose I use airodump-ng which displays clients connected to the APs it
finds while it captures traffic. To run airodump-ng I used this command:
bt ~ # airodump-ng -w report --bssid 00:23:5d:0e:01:90 --channel 11 wifi0
This command contains three parameters. The first one "-w report" is
the file airodump should store the captured data in. Airodump will append
-01.cap to the string or -02.cap, -03.cap and so forth if airodump has been
run before with the same parameter. A file with .cap ending is a capture file
that is compatible with wireshark and is the standard capture file format
for airodump.
The second parameter "–bssid 00:23:5d:0e:01:90" tells airodump to only
capture traffic to and from this MAC address. Without this parameter airo-
dump will capture traffic on other networks as well which is not necessary.
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Figure 3.2: Screenshot from Kismet displaying information on the Tradlos-
eTrondheim WLAN
The third parameter "–channel 11" tells airodump to only listen on chan-
nel 11. When listening to a single AP, tuning in on its channel is very
useful. Without this parameter airodump uses channel hopping by default.
This means that airodump only listens to each wireless channel for a short
amount of time before moving to another channel. This means that much of
the traffic to and from the target AP will not be captured while airodump
is listening to other channels.
The last part of the command is the interface airodump will capture
from.
The screenshot in figure 3.3 shows the clients currently associated with
the AP supplied as input. The client listed in this screenshot is the computer
that plays the role of the innocent victim. We now have the clients MAC
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Figure 3.3: Screenshot from airodump displaying traffic on the Wireless
Trondheim access point and an associated client
address and can add another point to the list of required information.
• Clients MAC address: 00:23:54:18:37:9E
The next step is to find the clients IP address. This can be found through
the dump file which has now been made by airodump. The program I used
to open the file was Wireshark. Wireshark has many advanced filters that
can be applied to the packet dump. The filter strings are entered into the
text box at the top of the window. I only typed "ip" which filters away all
the unnecessary 802.11 packets that does not contain a payload of data.
Figure 3.4 is a screenshot from wireshark that contains all the informa-
tion needed to establish the IP address of the host that has the known MAC
address. When selecting a packet from the upper display window more de-
tailed information appears in the window below. The category IEEE 802.11
Data, Flags: can be expanded and more information on the layer 2 part
of the packet can be found. The senders MAC address matches the clients
MAC found earlier so the senders IP address is the clients IP address.
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Figure 3.4: Screenshot from Wireshark that shows a captured IP packet and
its sender MAC address
• Clients IP address: 10.100.0.27
4 out of 7 points in the list of required information has now been covered.
The three remaining points are parameters for the Wireless Trondheim net-
work that are needed to be able to connect to and use the Internet through
Wireless Trondheim. All of these parameters can be found by making a
legitimate connection to Wireless Trondheim once. It is sufficient to make
a connection without going through authentication to get this information.
Figure 3.5 shows the result of entering "ipconfig /all" in a DOS prompt
window in Windows.
From here the three last points on the list can be found.
• Subnet mask: 255.255.254.0
• Default gateway: 10.100.0.1
32
Figure 3.5: Screenshot from ipconfig in Windows with information about
the Wireless Trondheim network
• DNS server: 194.19.2.11 and 194.19.3.11
3.3.1.4 Executing the attack
All the information needed is now known and the actual attack can be
performed. The network interface card is currently in monitor mode and
has to be switched to managed mode to be able to make a connection to
Wireless Trondheim. This is done by reversing the procedure from earlier.
bt ~ # modprobe -r ipwraw
bt ~ # modprobe iwl3945
The first step is to enter two lines into iptables to avoid the problems
with tcp sessions explained in section 2.5.2.2. This is done with the following
commands.
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bt ~ # iptables -A INPUT -i wlan0 -m state --state ESTABLISHED
,RELATED -j ACCEPT
bt ~ # iptables -A IMPUT -i wlan0 -p tcp -j DROP
Iptables can be considered as the equivalent to the Windows firewall in
Linux. By entering rules into iptables a user can make his own customized
firewall. The first command enters a rule into iptables that tells Linux to
accept all packets that belongs to currently known TCP sessions. The second
command enters a rule that tells Linux to drop all packets from unknown
TCP sessions. This way the attackers computer will not send a TCP-RST
when receiving a TCP-SYN from a session initiated by the client. This will
prevent the user from noticing anything about the attack.
The second step is to spoof the MAC address of the client network card.
This is done with the following commands.
bt ~ # ifconfig wlan0 down
bt ~ # macchanger --mac=00:23:54:18:27:9e wlan0
bt ~ # ifconfig wlan0 up
The last step is to set up the connection itself, which is done with the
following commands.
bt ~ # /sbin/iwconfig wlan0 mode managed channel 11 key off
essid TradloseTrondheim
bt ~ # /sbin/iwconfig wlan0 ap 00:23:5d:0e:01:90
bt ~ # /sbin/ifconfig wlan0 10.100.0.27 netmask 255.255.254.0 up
bt ~ # route add default gw 10.100.0.1
The first two commands tells the wireless interface to associate with
the Wireless Trondheim access point. The third command sets a static
IP to the wireless interface. Normally this is done via DHCP, but that
creates complications with the already existing client so a static IP has to
be configured. The last command adds a default route to the Linux routing
table.
The only thing left now is to start a browser and hope the targeted client
has a firewall enabled on his computer so the client does not interrupt the
attackers traffic by sending TCP-RST messages. If the attack is successful
the attacker can browse the web like a normal user of Wireless Trondheim
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without having to authenticate himself through the web-portal. The free
access will only last until the legitimate users MAC address is removed from
the Nomadix white list either by time out or when the user uses the log off
function.
3.3.2 MAC spoofing in Windows
When doing the attack in Backtrack it became clear that there was no need
to use a highly specialized OS to perform the simple tasks needed. The same
attack can be performed in Windows which is normally a very limited OS
when it comes to penetration testing. This section is a walkthrough of how
the freeloading type of MAC spoofing can be performed in Windows.
When using the wireless network manager in Backtrack to connect to a
network it will automatically make a DHCP request to Wireless Trondheim
to setup the required IP settings. This is why a completely manual con-
nection to the Wireless Trondheim network has to be made. In Windows
this can be avoided by choosing the "Use the following IP address" option in
the properties window of TCP/IP setup. There is no need to find specific
information about the APs MAC and channel.
The following list is a summary of what is needed:
• Clients MAC address
• Clients IP address
• Subnet mask
• Default gateway
• DNS server
The first step is to capture some network traffic to get a hold of a clients
MAC and IP addresses. I did this with Wireshark in the Windows based
attack. In Windows it is not possible to switch the wireless card to moni-
tor mode like in Backtrack. Instead Wireshark uses promiscuous mode to
capture other clients traffic. The purpose of both promiscuous mode and
monitor mode is that the network card passes along all packets it receives
to the CPU and not only the ones addressed to it. The difference between
them is that promiscuous mode requires the wireless network card to be
associated with the network the user wants to listen to.
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To capture some traffic I connected to Wireless Trondheim and started
Wireshark. I had problems with packet capture in Vista on my laptop so for
the Windows attack the attacker and client switched places. The victim was
the laptop running Windows Vista and the attacker was the former client
desktop running Windows XP SP2. Figure 3.6 is a screenshot from a packet
dump done on the attacking computer. It shows a client with a highlighted
packet containing the IP and MAC address of the client.
Figure 3.6: Screenshot from wireshark in Windows showing a client with IP
and MAC address
• Clients MAC address: 00:19:D2:AE:04:DB
• Clients IP address: 10.100.0.18
The rest of the information needed can already be looked up in ipconfig.
I started a command prompt window and entered "ipconfig /all". From this
window which is similar to figure 3.5 the rest of the information needed
about the Wireless Trondheim network could be found.
• Subnet mask: 255.255.254.0
• Default gateway: 10.100.0.1
• DNS server: 194.19.2.11 and 194.19.3.11
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3.3.2.1 Executing the attack
The necessary information has been found and the attack can now be per-
formed. First the MAC address of the client have to be spoofed. in Windows
there is an easy way and a hard way to do this. The easy way is to configure
the MAC address of the network interface from the network configuration
window in Windows. The hard way is to change a value in the registry
containing the MAC address. Note that when changing the MAC address in
Windows it will not reset back to the factory value stored in the hardware
of the network card at reboot like it will in Linux.
The easy way
Before changing the MAC address in this way go to the desktop and right
click my network places and select configure. Then right click the wireless
interface and choose disable. This is to stop Windows from renewing the IP
address via DHCP automatically after the MAC address has been changed.
Then right click on My network places and select properties. Right
click the wireless interface and select properties. Select configure to the
right of the name of the network card and go to the advanced tab. If the
network cards drivers support it the list will contain a field called Locally
administered MAC address or something similar. I clicked the radio button
for value and entered the clients MAC address found in the packet capture
in the format written below.
0019D2AE04DB
If the locally administered MAC-address option is not in the list, the
harder option of changing MAC address will have to be used.
The hard way
The hard way is to change the MAC address in the registry. The following
procedure is a short version of the guide from [3].
Some information needs to be gathered about where to look in the reg-
istry first. I went to command prompt and enter "ipconfig /all" and took
note of the name of the network interface card. I entered "net config rdr" in
the same window and took note of the long string of numbers and letters.
In my case it was the following.
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{E09127F0-E706-462E-87BF-829ACD208A88}
Then I started the registry editor by typing "regedt32" in the run window
from the start menu. The registry contains a large tree of important values
used by Windows and it is always useful to make a backup in case something
is done wrong. Right click a tree node in the registry editor and choose
export to make a backup of all the sub nodes of that node.
Now the field containing the MAC address for the wireless interface has
to be found. The first path of the registry path is the following. Make sure
the last folder is correct as there is a long list of almost identical folders.
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Class\
{4D36E972-E325-11CE-BFC1-08002BE10318}
A list of folders named 0000, 0001, 0002 and so forth should appear
and one of these contains the field with the MAC address. To determine
which of the folders it is they have to be checked one by one. Most of the
folders contains among others a field called DriverDesc and another called
NetCfgINstanceId. When these two fields match the interface name and
the string of numbers and letters found earlier the correct folder has been
found. In my case the correct folder was 0012.
The field NetworkAddress contains the MAC address Windows will
use for the network interface. I changed this to the value obtained by cap-
turing network traffic.
Configuring TCP/IP
Now the attacker computer had the same MAC as the client computer.
The next step was to configure the attacker computer to use a static IP.
This was done by going to My network places -> properties -> wireless
interface -> properties. Then find Internet protocol (TCP/IP), select it
and click on properties. Then I selected "use the following IP address" and
"Use the following DNS addresses". I entered the information found in the
information gathering phase. The last step was to connect to the wireless
Trondheim network like usual through the built in wireless netowkr manager
in Windows. The attacking computer now had full access to the Internet
without going through the authentication procedure, but when the clients
MAC address is removed from the Nomadix white list the free access for the
attacker is lost.
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Chapter 4
Countermeasures
This chapter contains a recap of the proposed countermeasures and some
thoughts about how to implement them into the Wireless Trondheim net-
work.
4.1 Session ID
Session ID is a countermeasure targeted towards the session hijacking and
waiting for availability types of MAC spoofing. A network using the session
ID countermeasure creates an SSL encrypted connection to a web page with
a cookie associated to it. The cookie contains a session ID and is sent to the
client after the connection has been set up so eavesdroppers can’t find out
what the ID is. The web page tells the clients browser to request refreshes
with a given interval and the cookie is sent along with each refresh request.
As long as the Wireless Trondheim IDS keeps getting the refresh requests
with the correct ID it can assume the original client is still active on the
network. This was a quick recap of the session ID countermeasure and the
following subsection is a suggestion on how it can be implemented in the
Wireless Trondheim network.
4.1.1 Implementing Session ID
This countermeasure is the easiest one to implement because the elements
needed are already present in the Wireless Trondheim network. The main
reason for this is that there is a web server involved in the authentication
procedure. Figure 2.1 is only a simplified overview and does not show the
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web server. In the authentication phase the user is communicating with the
web server and the web server tells the Nomadix device to add the user if
the authentication is successful. Figure 4.1 illustrates the web servers role
in the authentication phase.
Figure 4.1: The webserver as an intermediary in the authentication phase
It is the web server that sets up the SSL protected communication and
verifies the user input such as in the case where NTNU students use their
user name and password. The input here is sent by the web server to an
authentication system at NTNU.
Only some added functionality in the web server is needed to implement
the session ID countermeasure.
Figure 4.2 is a simplified sequence diagram illustrating how the session
ID countermeasure would work. The first part which is not shown in the
figure is the same as before with the user being redirected to the web-portal
authentication page after connecting to Wireless Trondheim. The first step
in the sequence diagram is that the user sends his authentication information
to the web server. If the authentication succeeds the web server sends a
message about adding the user to the Nomadix device.
The next step is were the difference is. Either the user has to be redi-
rected to a new web-page or a new pop-up window will have to be opened.
This new web-page will be secured with SSL and get an associated cookie
that contains a session ID generated for the current session. The web page
will also contain the following HTML code that will make the users browser
request refreshes with a given interval.
http-equiv="refresh"
The associated cookie containing the session ID will be sent along with
each refresh request. The first message in the bottom half of the sequence
diagram shows that the users browser sends a refresh request containing the
session ID. The web server should run a script or program with a certain
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Figure 4.2: Sequence diagram that roughly illustrates how the session ID
countermeasure will work
interval and cycle through the list of users and check if all of them have
refreshed their ID recently. The last two messages in the diagram shows
that a hijacker has thrown the user off the network and the refresh request
can not be sent to the web-server. When the web-server runs its check it will
discover that the hijacked user has not refreshed his ID and can take som
sort of action. This could be either to tell the Nomadix device to remove
the user as illustrated in figure 4.2 or to note the event in a log.
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4.2 MAC sequence number analysis
The MAC sequence number analysis countermeasure is targeted towards the
freeloading type of MAC spoofing attack. An IDS using this countermeasure
analyzes the sequence numbers in MAC frames. The MAC frame sequence
number is incremented by one for every layer 2 frame sent by a wireless
interface card. Under normal circumstances with one client using the same
MAC address a plot of the MAC sequence number will be a straight line.
If an attacker freeloads using the clients MAC address its MAC sequence
number counter will be different from the clients. An IDS should be able to
detect two different counters in the stream of sequence numbers.
4.2.1 Proof of concept for MAC sequence number analysis
This master thesis does not include any practical implementations of the
proposed countermeasures. However in the case of the MAC sequence num-
ber analysis a simple proof of concept experiment has been conducted. In
addition a control experiment was conducted with only the client connected.
The idea is to make a packet dump of the network traffic while the
freeloading attack is being performed. By generating traffic simultaneously
at both the attacker and the client it should be easy to browse through the
packet dump in Wireshark and see that the MAC sequence numbers are
making big jumps between two different counters.
The packet dump was done by the passive monitor machine with airo-
dump and the packet dump was started with the following command.
root@ubuntu:~# airodump-ng -w maqseqtest
--bssid 00:23:5d:0e:01:90 --channel 11 ath1
After a short while with generating traffic in both the clients and attackers
browsers the packet dump was stopped and the dump file was opened in
Wireshark.
The filter string "ip.src == 10.100.0.80" was used to only show IP packets
sent by the client and attacker. The sequence number of the MAC frames
these IP packets were sent with can be viewed by expanding the information
tab below beginning with IEEE 802.11. By using the arrow keys to scroll
down the list of packets it could be observed that two different MAC frame
counters was in use.
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Figure 4.3: The first 100 MAC sequence numbers from the proof of concept
experiment
Figure 4.3 is a plot for the first 100 observed MAC sequence numbers in
the dump file. Many of the entries had identical MAC sequence numbers
and in these cases the first occurrence of the sequence number was recorded.
Further studies are needed to determine why the MAC sequence numbers
appears in several IP packets. The duplicate sequence numbers also occurred
in the control experiment with only the user using the connection, but to a
lesser extent. The duplicate sequence numbers also seemed to be connected
to duplicate TCP ACKs which also was present in both the control test and
the main experiment.
The figure clearly shows that the MAC sequence number makes big leaps
between two groups of values. On both the top and bottom values it can
be seen that the counter is continuously rising which is the normal behavior
of the counter. The computer using the lowest sequence numbers is sending
more traffic so its counter is rising more rapidly. For the computer using the
highest sequence numbers the increase is not as easy to see, but still visible.
It is not easy to tell which of the counters belongs to the client and attacker,
but the fact that there is two counters is sufficient to tell that an attacker is
present. An interesting note is that if the assymetry in transmitted traffic
were to continue the lower curve would cross the higher one and continue
upwards.
The graph only shows the order of the packets and not the time between
them. Any information about how close together the packets were is lost
in this representation, but it clearly shows the two different MAC sequence
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counters. It might be useful to know however that the packets in the plot
were captured in a timeframe of about 2,4s.
Figure 4.4: 100 MAC sequence numbers from the control test
Figure 4.4 shows a group of 100 consecutive MAC sequence numbers from
the control test with only the client using the connection. The expected
result was a straight continuously increasing line, but in the control test
there were two jumps in the MAC sequence number counter. The reason
for this is also subject to further studies. These MAC frames was collected
in a timeframe of about 90 seconds which is significantly longer then in the
proof of concept test.
4.2.2 Implementing MAC sequence number analysis
The most critical aspect of implementing the MAC sequence number analysis
will be how to capture and store the MAC sequence numbers from all the
frames being sent by clients in Wireless Trondheim.
4.2.2.1 Capturing sequence numbers
If the 802.11 header is removed by the access point before sending it into
the wired part of Wireless Trondheim it will be difficult to capture and store
them in a central location.
The ideal situation would be that the 802.11 header used on the air
between the client and AP is available in a central point in the network. A
computer could listen to the the traffic in this central point and record the
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MAC sequence numbers of all the frames sent by clients. How this will be
done in an implementation is subject to further studies.
4.2.2.2 Storing and analyzing sequence numbers
When a user authenticates a unique session should be created and all the
MAC sequence numbers sent by that user is associated with that session.
The IDS system can then analyze each session at a later point in time and
determine if more then one MAC sequence number counter is in use.
It may seem like a huge task to monitor all the traffic being sent by
the users of Wireless Trondheim, but there are a few aspects of the tasks
that might make it more feasible. The first thing is that only the traffic
being sent by the clients needs to be monitored. The traffic pattern of the
majority of Internet users is that they download a lot more then they upload
so the amount of traffic that requires analysis might not be as large as one
might expect. Another aspect is that the IDS only needs the MAC sequence
number from each MAC frame. The sequence number value is 12 bits long
so the required storage capacity will be 12 bits pr frame being sent by clients
connected to Wireless Trondheim. In addition there will be some overhead
depending on how the sequence numbers are being stored and associated
with their respective sessions.
4.3 Physical parameters
The physical parameter countermeasures base themselves on physical prop-
erties of the radio signals. These physical properties are the time it takes to
complete a RTS-CTS handshake and the signal strength of received frames
from clients. When an attacker performs a MAC spoofing attack the IDS
detects changes in these values and takes action. The IDS correlates be-
tween the two methods and a detection must be made by both before an
alarm can be raised.
4.3.1 Implementing physical parameters countermeasures
These countermeasures are perhaps the most difficult to implement in a pub-
lic wireless network such as Wireless Trondheim. The important information
here is the received signal strength of frames received by all the access points
45
and round trip times for RTS-CTS handshakes. The authors of [9] uses a
passive sensor with a prism2 chip set. This chip set has the ability to append
an additional header to each frame in addition to the 802.11 header. This
extra header contains physical parameters such as received signal strength
and timestamps for the frames.
The information about physical parameters are only available to the
access points and have to be recorded in the same way the prism2 chip set
does it or in some other similar way. Once the frames are sent into the wired
part of Wireless Trondheim the required information can not be recreated
by any means. The implementation of these countermeasures are therefore
reliant on what functionality the chip set in the wireless Trondheim access
point can offer.
In the practical experiment done in [9] they use a separate sensor to
record the information needed by the IDS. In Wireless Trondheim it is not
practical to deploy sensors in addition to the already existing infrastructure
of access points covering the city of Trondheim. The implementation of
these countermeasures depends on the access points ability to record this
information when receiving frames from the users.
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Chapter 5
Results
This chapter contains a summary of the work that has been done in this
masters thesis. The main goal stated in the problem description his how
to get technical evidence of a session hijacking attack that has taken place.
The first step towards this goal is to find ways that session hijacking attacks
can be performed. And the target of these attacks as stated in the prob-
lem description is the existing infrastructure in Wireless Trondheim. Given
the two access mechanisms in Wireless Trondheim which is the less secure
portal solution and the more secure RSN based eduroam solution the portal
solution is the most natural candidate for a session hijacking attack.
5.1 Penetration testing
The portal solution in Wireless Trondheim uses only MAC filtering so the
attack of choice is a MAC spoofing attack. In [10] Brustolini and Xia de-
scribes three variants of MAC spoofing attacks. These are the hijacking
variant where the client is actively thrown off the network, the freeloading
variant where the attacker communicates simultaneously with the client and
the third variant of waiting until the client is not using the network.
To do practical experiments a test bench was needed. A suitable test
bench illustrated in figure 3.1 was set up which consisted of a laptop com-
puter acting as the attacker, a desktop computer as the regular client and a
desktop computer acting as a passive sensor to monitor the traffic between
client attacker and AP. The test bench was set up in Wireless Trondheims
office in room 241 in the IT-building at NTNU. A Wireless Trondheim AP
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was installed in the office to provide access to the production network in
Wireless Trondheim for the test bench.
Backtrack was installed on the attacker computer and the freeloading
variant of MAC spoofing attack was performed successfully. The same type
of attack was also performed in Windows XP to prove that it can also be
done with a less specialized OS.
5.2 Countermeasures
The second part of the problem description is to look at ways to gain tech-
nical evidence proving that a session hijacking attack has taken place. Some
possible countermeasures were found in [10] and [8]. The four proposed
countermeasures are session ID, MAC sequence number analysis, received
signal strength and RTS-CTS handshake. Some thoughts have been made
about how each of these countermeasures can be implemented in the Wire-
less Trondheim network and what the difficulties are. A proof of concept
experiment was conducted for the MAC sequence number analysis counter-
measure.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
6.1 Real-time analysis vs logs
Most intrusion detection systems do real time analysis of the network traffic
to detect suspicious behavior. That way they can take action immediately
when an attack occurs. Both a reactive IDS and a passive IDS does real
time analysis and the difference is that the reactive IDS takes direct action
to stop an attack and the passive IDs makes log entries or alarms.
What I suggest for an implementation in Wireless Trondheim is that
there is no real-time analysis of the network traffic. The necessary data
should be recorded in logs for analysis at a later point in time Wireless
Trondheims main concern is not to block attackers that only want free access,
but if a user is accused of criminal activities the IDS should be able to tell
that his network identity was spoofed or not. Blocking users leeching on the
network requires real-time analysis, but if any user is accused of criminal
usage of the network it will be days or weeks after the actual incident.
If any criminal activity is reported the logs can be analyzed with the
appropriate methods to see if any suspicious activity can be found. The
assumptions one can make from the result of the analysis depends on the
reliability of the IDS. Lets say Wireless Trondheim is asked by the police to
supply information about a suspect in a criminal investigation. If the IDS
is perfect and the suspects activities does not show signs of identity theft
the suspect will be guilty of using Wireless Trondheim for criminal activity.
If the suspects activities does show signs of identity theft the user is either
innocent or made an attack on himself to avoid suspicion.
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However an IDS system can never be perfect and any results from the
analysis of network traffic can only be used as circumstantial evidence. More
solid evidence will need to be gathered to be sure that a suspect is guilty, but
the result from an IDS in Wireless Trondheim can help to either strengthen
or weaken the suspicion towards the user.
6.2 False positives vs false negatives
In Wireless Trondheims case the most important aspect is to avoid false
negative situations. A false negative situation is equivalent to an attacker
doing MAC spoofing without being detected by the IDS. The main goal of
Wireless Trondheim is to detect MAC spoofing in the case of criminal usage
of the network. Minimizing false negatives which is a good thing requires
an IDS to be more strict, but that also increases false positives which is a
bad thing. Too many false positives makes the IDS loose its credibility, but
avoiding false negatives should still be the priority of an IDS solution in
Wireless Trondheim so a balance needs to be found.
6.3 Countermeasures
This section will discuss the proposed countermeasures and how well they
fit into Wireless Trondheims needs and wishes for a possible IDS solution.
6.3.1 Session ID
The major drawback of the session ID countermeasure is the pop-up win-
dow that will contain the web-page with the associated session ID cookie.
The page could contain a warning to the user that his connection to Wire-
less Trondheim will be terminated shortly after closing it. This would be
annoying for many users which might want to close it and many users will
probably close it from forgetfulness or from being unaware of the warning.
Wireless Trondheim does not wish to decrease the user friendliness of their
current access solution.
To throw clients off the network in real time is easy to implement with
this countermeasure. This is because it relies on the continuous check to
see if the clients have updated the session ID recently. However Wireless
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Trondheim does not wish to throw clients off the network in real-time be-
cause their main focus is any long term criminal consequences of session
hijacking.
Another solution could be to make logs where it is recorded if a client
fails to make its session ID refreshes. The downside to this is that this log
would contain a lot of false positives from clients that e.g. forgets to keep
their pop-up window open.
This countermeasure is the easiest one to implement, but is has some
drawbacks that makes it unsuitable for a practical implementation. The
decrease in user friendliness from the pop-up window and the disputable
usefulness of making logs instead of throwing users off in real-time is the
reason why this countermeasure is not recommended for implementation in
Wireless Trondheim.
6.3.2 MAC sequence number analysis
This countermeasure is the one that fits the best into Wireless Trondheims
wishes about a possible IDS solution against hijacking attacks. The presence
of this countermeasure will not be noticeable by normal users of Wireless
Trondheim at all. All the countermeasure does is to extract the MAC se-
quence number from the frames they send. The countermeasure does not
store any of the data the clients send so an implementation will not be
affected by legal issues surrounding data storage.
The countermeasure is also ideal for the logging approach that Wireless
Trondheim wishes to follow. The IDS can make logs containing the MAC
sequence numbers for each user session and the relevant logs can be analyzed
at a later point in time in the event of any criminal activity.
The only uncertain aspect of the countermeasure is how the IDS will
gather the MAC sequence numbers from frames sent by the users. Given that
this can be implemented in the Wireless Trondheim network I recommend
this countermeasure for further study and implementation.
6.3.3 Physical parameters
The two countermeasures in this category are the ones with the most uncer-
tainty tied to them. The data about received signal strength and RTS-CTS
handshakes will have to be recorded by the access points and stored in some
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central location. Unless the chip set in the access points have functionality
to do this it could be very hard to gather this data.
It is also uncertain how this countermeasure will work in a full scale
network in an urban environment such as wireless Trondheim. The practical
testing in [9] was done in a small scale network involving office landscapes,
but more information on how it would work in a large network like Wireless
Trondheim is needed.
On the plus side these countermeasures fit well with Wireless Trondheims
wish to make logs instead of actively kicking users. As with the MAC
sequence number countermeasure the received signal strength and RTS-CTS
values can be stored and analyzed at a later time if necessary.
These countermeasures are overall not recommended for a possible im-
plementation because of the uncertainty concerning how well they will work
in a full scale urban network and how the IDS will gather the necessary
information.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and future work
7.1 Conclusion
The thesis has proven that a session hijacking attack in the form of MAC
spoofing against Wireless Trondheim is easy to perform. No specialized OS
is required to be able to perform the attack. At the time of writing this
thesis there is no mechanism in Wireless Trondheim that can detect a MAC
spoofing attack. A person with criminal motives may use an innocent users
session to perform criminal activities and Wireless Trondheim will not at the
present date be able to tell that the innocent user was hijacked and might
not be guilty.
7.1.1 Relevant countermeasures
The thesis has proposed these countermeasures and evaluated if they are
recommended for a possible IDS solution in Wireless Trondheim that will
protect against session hijacking attacks. The basis for the evaluation is
Wireless Trondheims wishes for the IDS and what the difficulties are for
implementing them in the Wireless Trondheim network.
Session ID
This countermeasure is the easiest to implement, but it has two drawbacks
that does not fit into Wireless Trondheims requirements for an IDS. It de-
creases user friendliness by requiring a browser window to stay open to avoid
triggering the IDS countermeasure. This countermeasure is also best suited
for throwing suspected users off the network in real time which is something
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Wireless Trondheim does not wish to do. Based on these two drawbacks the
countermeasure is not recommended for further work.
MAC sequence numbers
This countermeasure fits best with Wireless Trondheims requirements for
a possible IDS implementation. It is suitable for making logs that can be
analyzed a long time after an incident took place. This countermeasure
should be feasible to implement given that the MAC sequence numbers are
available at a central point in the wireless Trondheim network. This is
the countermeasure recommended by the thesis for a possible future IDS
solution.
Physical parameters
The countermeasures in this category have the most uncertainty tied to
them. They will probably be the hardest to implement because the data re-
quired by the IDS can only be recorded by the APs and an implementation
relies on their ability to do so. It is also uncertain how well this countermea-
sure will work in an urban environment with many moving clients and highly
unpredictable paths and reflections for radio waves. This countermeasure is
not recommended for further work.
7.1.2 Additional security needed
This thesis recommends one countermeasure that will protect against the
freeloading variant of MAC spoofing attack. In addition to this variant there
is the hijacking type and the waiting for availability type that will not be
detected without additional IDS mechanisms. Ideally all the types of attacks
should be protected against, but with the lack of a countermeasure that fits
with Wireless Trondheims wishes the thesis can only recommend protection
against the freeloading type.
7.2 Future work
The initial ambition for this thesis was that more substantial work would be
done on the countermeasure part of the thesis. This was also the wish from
Wireless Trondheims viewpoint and the countermeasures part is represented
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more strongly in the problem description then in the thesis itself. The
recommendations for future work is therefore focused on countermeasures
and on the MAC sequence number countermeasure in particular.
An evaluation of how the MAC sequence numbers can be gathered and
tied to its respective sessions should be conducted. If this is found to be
possible to realize in the existing Wireless Trondheim network work can
begin on implementing the MAC sequence number analysis countermeasure.
More information on the behavior of the MAC sequence number counter
will be needed to make reliable analysis of the MAC sequence number logs
possible. This thesis has for the most part assumed that the MAC sequence
number counter is always incremented by one for each frame, but the control
test in 4.2.1 shows a deviation from this.
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